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ABORTION AND HARM TO CHILDREN:
LIMITS ON TELEVISION POLITICAL
ADVERTISEMENTS
David Ozmun*
Candidates wanting to air advertisements containing
graphic depictions of aborted fetuses presented
television stations with a dilemma. Sections 312(a)(7)
and 315(a) of the Communications Act prevent
broadcasters from censoring or restricting the political
advertisements of legally qualified candidates seeking
federal office. Under the United States Criminal Code,
broadcasting material deemed indecent may result in
penalties. Also, the Federal Communications
Commission and courts have expressed concern about
"harm to children" caused by televised material.
While the FCC disagreed with a district court
judge's ruling that political ads containing depictions
of aborted fetuses were indecent, it did affirm a
broadcast licensee's right to "channel" such ads to a
time of day when children are less likely to be in the
audience. This provides broadcasters, for the first
time, with some editorial discretion during federal
election seasons. However, by not giving broadcasters
control over advertising enjoyed by other media, the
FCC may have encouraged candidates to further test
the limits of Sections 312 and 315.
For years, the political campaign season has presented broad-
casters with a dilemma. Three demands of the Communications Act,
*Assistant professor, Ouachita Baptist University.
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though seemingly contradictory, became intertwined and created
confusion as to precedence. First, candidates for federal elective
office must be afforded air time. In addition, broadcasters may not
censor the material produced by these candidates. When broadcast-
ers were faced with problematic content in federal campaign adver-
tisements, lawmakers, regulators and courts normally sided with
the candidates.
However, a broadcaster's license may be revoked for broadcast-
ing obscene, indecent or profane language. And in recent years, the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or the Commission),
Congress and the courts have effectively broadened this concern to
include material that could ostensibly be considered harmful to
children. When several political campaign ads in 1992 and 1994
introduced unparalleled controversial content—the graphic depic-
tion of aborted fetuses—broadcasters sought guidance and relief
from the government.
Several candidates intentionally forced the issue by pitting the
rights of the candidate against the responsibilities of the broad-
caster. Milagros Rivera-Sanchez and Paul H. Gates, in tracing the
history of indecency and political advertising, predicted that broad-
casters would not need to fear sanctions from airing the pro-life
candidates' advertisements.1 Seeking permission to channel the
controversial material into late night/early morning hours may have
only further diverted broadcasters from First Amendment objec-
tives they ultimately desire.
This article begins with a review of the history behind contro-
versial political advertising content. It then focuses on the attempts
to restrict pro-life candidates' television content as a case study of
how statutory and judicial decisions have attempted to provide a
solution to a broadcasting anomaly. Specifically, this article consid-
ers the use of depictions of aborted fetuses in television advertise-
ments and the efforts of broadcasters to restrict these ads. Finally,
a call for a comprehensive review of the pertinent policies and issues
is recommended.
The evolution of this broadcasting quandary took many years
as questions were raised seriatum. What finally emerged is a
twisted regulatory knot tied and retied by sometimes conflicting
legislative, executive and judicial action. The results have alter-
1Milagros Rivera-Sanchez & Paul H. Gates, Jr., Abortion on the Air: Broadcasters
and Indecent Political Advertising, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 267, 287 (1994).
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nated between binding and loosening the knot for both broadcasters
and candidates for federal office.
POLITICAL ADVERTISING AND THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The statutes dealing with political broadcasting are found in
Sections 312 and 315 of the Communications Act. Section 312
requires broadcasters to air material produced by candidates for
federal office. It threatens revocation of a broadcaster's license for
"willful or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting
station by a legally qualified candidate for federal elective office on
behalf of his candidacy."2 The question of who legally qualifies as a
candidate was answered by the FCC in 1978, i.e., such a person must
(a) be eligible under law to hold the office if elected, (b) announce
one's candidacy and (c) qualify for a place on the ballot or be eligible
under law for election as a write-in candidate and make a "substan-
tial showing."3 The constitutionality of reasonable access was an-
swered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1981. The
Court ruled that once the campaign season begins, broadcasters
"must give reasonable and good-faith attention to access requests
from 'legally qualified' candidates for federal elective office."4
Section 315 prohibits prior restraint by broadcasters of federal
candidates' advertising content.5 The first case heard by the Su-
preme Court challenging this statute concerned content considered
libelous. A radio station in North Dakota wanted to keep out refer-
ences by the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of Amer-
ica concerning government officials. The announcer called them
"Communists." The Court decided that censoring "allegedly libelous
remarks would undermine the basic purpose for which Section 315
was passed—full and unrestricted discussion of political issues by
legally qualified candidates."6 Thus, broadcasters could not censor
content, but they also would not be held accountable for the content.7
247 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1994).
3The Law of Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d 2209, 2216-
2217 (1978).
4CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 387 (1981).
547 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1994) ("provided, that such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the provisions of this section").
6Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525, 529
(1959).
7Political Broadcasting and Cablecasting, 69 F.C.C.2d at 2220.
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Later challenges concerned inflammatory language. In 1972,
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) requested that the FCC allow broadcasters to reject polit-
ical advertisements that contained the word "nigger." The candi-
date, J.B. Stoner, sought a seat in the U.S. Senate. In its request,
the NAACP indicated some broadcasters had received bomb threats,
and it was the stations' responsibility to avoid these ads. The FCC
found no evidence of the threats and, citing the WDAY decision,
refused to grant the request.8
In 1978, the. Supreme Court's Pacifica decision upheld the
constitutionality of restricting the broadcasting of indecent and
obscene material.9 The NAACP returned to the FCC with its request
that the word "nigger" be prevented from being broadcast, now
based on the Pacifica.10 In its response, the Commission said the
word did not fall under its definition of indecency, a definition
upheld by the Court.11 Even if it were found indecent, however,
Section 315 and Section 32612 would have prohibited broadcasters
from preventing a candidate's use of the word in a television ad.13
In 1980, employees at NBC Radio initially refused to air a
commercial for presidential candidate Barry Commoner of the Cit-
izens Party. The advertisement included one of the seven words
ruled indecent by the FCC and the Supreme Court in Pacifica. The
network's attorneys advised NBC to air the advertisement in its
entirety, which it did. Nevertheless, Commoner subsequently
lodged a complaint with the FCC that NBC's initial refusal had
violated Section 315. The Commission warned NBC to make its staff
aware that there could be no censorship of political ads, even those
containing offensive language.14
In 1984, the first indication that broadcasters might restrict the
content of political advertising arose. Hustler magazine publisher
8Atlanta NAACP, 36 F.C.C.2d 635 (1972).
9FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
10Julian Bond, NAACP, 69 F.C.C.2d 943 (1978) (Broadcast Bureau).
11FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. at 944 (upholding FCC decision declaring
seven words recorded by comedian George Carlin and aired on WBAI-FM, New
York, to be indecent).
1247 U.S.C. § 326 (1994) ("Nothing in this Act shall be understood or construed
to give the Commission the power of censorship ..., and no regulation or condition
shall be promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the
right of free speech by means of radio communication.").
13Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C.2d at 944.
14Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris, 87 F.C.C.2d 1 (1980).
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Larry Flynt announced his intention to run for president by buying
advertising in newspapers around the United States. He also de-
clared his plans to challenge obscenity laws by showing "X-rated
presidential campaign commercials" featuring "hard-core sex
acts."15 Flynt later withdrew from the race, but not before the issue
drew responses from several quarters. When members of Congress
were told by FCC general counsel Bruce Fein that, indeed, broad-
casters would be presented with a dilemma, Rep. Thomas A. Luken
made it known that he planned to announce legislation banning
"obscene" language.16 Then the FCC published a memorandum
stating its position that broadcasters did not have to air obscenities.
A broadcaster would be justified in refusing access to a candidate who
intended to utter obscene or indecent language, because Section
312(a)(6) ... must be granted to carve an exception to Section
312(a)(7). ... The application of both traditional norms of statutory
construction as well as an analysis of the legislative evolution of
Section 315 militate in favor or [sic] reading section 1464 as an
exception to Section 315.17
In a subsequent letter to Luken, FCC Chair Mark Fowler also
broached the idea that a broadcaster's responsibility under Section
1464 of the U.S. Criminal Code18 supersedes Sections 315(a) and
Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act.19 The contents of these
statements by the Commission would help broadcasters' arguments
15Martin Schram & James R. Dickenson, Political Notes, WASH. POST, Dec. 2,
1983, at A3.
16The Supreme Court defined obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973), using a threefold test: (a) whether the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest, (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law, and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or
scientific value. Obscenity is distinguished from the prohibition on indecent content
applied to broadcasters. See FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
17FCC Staff Memorandum, Jan. 6, 1984, quoted in Gillett Commun. of Atlanta,
Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal dismissed without op.,
5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993) (emphasis in original).
1818 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994) (making illegal broadcast of "obscene" or "indecent"
material).
19Letter from Mark S. Fowler to Hon. Thomas A. Luken, January 19, 1984,
construed in Vincent Pepper, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599, 5600 (1992) (Mass Media Bureau).
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in 1992 to restrict candidates' advertisements using graphic pic-
tures of aborted fetuses.
THE REGULATION OF INDECENCY
While the Communications Act forbids the FCC from exercising
prior restraint of broadcasts,20 the Commission may revoke a
broadcaster's license for airing indecent material.21 The Commis-
sion relies on Section 1464 of the United States Criminal Code,
which declared that "whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined
not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both."22 In 1987, the FCC determined that focusing on the seven
Pacifica words was an insufficient standard by which to enforce
indecency prohibitions.23 Instead, it proposed using the generic
definition it had stated in its response to the complaint against
WBAI-FM, i.e., "language or material that depicts or describes, in
terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities
or organs."24
The Commission also reaffirmed that the time of day when
material is broadcast may be a factor in determining whether it is
indecent. Part of the FCC's Pacifica test concerned
2047 U.S.C.A. § 326 (West 1995).
2147 U.S.CA § 312(a)(6) (West 1995).
2218 U.S.C. § 1464 (1994).
23Several complaints were brought to the FCC, including Infinity Broadcasting
Corporation of Pennsylvania, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727, recon. denied, 3 F.C.C.R. 930
(1987) (station found to have broadcast on several occasions programming that
"dwelt on sexual and excretory matters in a pandering and titillating fashion that
was patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium"); Pacifica Foundation, Inc., id. (licensee KPFK-FM, Los Ange-
les, had broadcast two programs found indecent, i.e., "IMRU" included "explicit
descriptions of sexual encounters," and "Shocktime U.S.A." contained "certain
expletives that one member of a local performing group made on a live program");
Regents of the University of California, id. (student radio station cited because "the
music broadcast contained a number of patently offensive references to sexual
organs and activities as measured by contemporary community standards for the
broadcast medium").
24New Indecency Enforcement Standards to be Applied to all Broadcast and
Amateur Radio Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2726 (1987).
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a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience, but (the FCC)
found that this benchmark is not susceptible to a uniform standard.
... The Commission further stated that indecent broadcasts could be
made at times when there is not a reasonable risk that children may
be in the audience and that, when such broadcasts were made,
advance warnings would continue to be required.... The Commission
concluded that, in order to limit children's access to such material on
radio and television, time channeling is a reasonable time, place and
manner restriction.25
WBAI-FM had broadcast the program during a weekday after-
noon. The FCC adopted time channeling, or moving programs to a
"safe harbor," as a compromise between concerns about indecency
and broadcasters' First Amendment rights. The exact time of day
when indecent programming would be permitted was challenged in
several court cases. In 1988,1991 and 1993, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit thwarted efforts by
the FCC and by Congress to implement various safe harbor periods.
In the first case, filed by several broadcasters and public inter-
est groups, the plaintiffs challenged the Commission's new policy
concerning indecency, and asked that the prohibition of indecent
programming from 6 a.m. to midnight be ruled unconstitutional.
The Court of Appeals denied the first complaint (deferring to
Supreme Court precedent), but found that the FCC had no basis for
the 18-hour ban, and called for further Commission hearings and
study.26
Before the FCC could act, Congress, in passing its annual
appropriation for the Commission, included the Helms Adult Radio
Amendment. It called on the FCC to enforce the indecency section
of the United States Code on a 24-hour basis.27 Challenged in court,
the District of Columbia Circuit found the complete ban unconstitu-
tional.28 Again, the FCC was told to conduct hearings on the safe
25Id.
26Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988),
overruled in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
27Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judicial and Related Agen-
cies Appropriation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228
(1988).
28Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 503 U.S. 913 (1992), overruled in part, Action for Children's Television v.
FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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harbor question, and justify its choice of a time when indecent
material could be broadcast.29
Once again, Congress stepped between the FCC and the courts.
In the Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, the Commission was
required to institute the 6 a.m. to midnight ban on indecency in
addition to the midnight to 6 a.m. ban already in place, effectively
requiring a complete ban on broadcasting indecent material.30 When
this provision reached the District of Columbia Circuit, the court,
relying on its first decision on this issue, struck down the safe harbor
mandate. It later vacated the decision for rehearing by the full
Circuit Court of Appeals.31 A requirement that indecent material be
channeled to the period from 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. was upheld in June
1995.32
DECISIONS ON PRO-LIFE CANDIDATES' COMMERCIALS
In 1992 several candidates for congressional seats across the
country added a new dimension to the troika of political advertising,
indecency and channeling. About a dozen candidates produced and
aired television advertisements that included footage of aborted
fetuses, allegedly the result of third-trimester abortions.33 The first
to do so, and arguably the most successful, was Michael Bailey who
ran for the Indiana House seat occupied by Rep. Lee Hamilton.
Bailey won the Republican primary, but in the general election,
Hamilton received 70 percent of the vote.34 Only one other candidate
using commercials showing aborted fetuses, Daniel Becker running
in Georgia, made it past the primary election.
The fetus pictures in Bailey's advertisements came from a 1991
documentary produced by American Portrait Films of Cleveland.
Some critics questioned whether the fetuses were aborted or the
29Id at 1509-1510.
30Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16, 106 Stat.
949 (1992).
31Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rehearing
en bane denied, vacated, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994), petition granted, remanded,
58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
32Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654.
33Keith Glover, Campaigning Crusaders Air Graphic Anti-Abortion Ads, Cong.
Q., Sept. 26, 1992, at 2970.
34Jason Vest, Campaigner in the Pit Bull Pulpit, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1993, at
Dl.
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result of stillbirths. At least one other candidate also aired pho-
tographs that were considered "sexually explicit."35 Bailey and the
other candidates agreed the footage was "repulsive" but neces-
sary. At least one candidate's spots began with a warning: "This
commercial is not suitable for small children, because abortion is
not suitable for America."36 Some ads compared abortion with the
Holocaust.37
The television advertisements brought complaints to television
stations, which led to requests for an FCC ruling on the ads. Two
stations covering Indiana's 9th Congressional District, located in
Indianapolis and Louisville, Kentucky, asked their attorneys to
determine their options. The stations were told that Section
312(a)(7) required them to air the ads and that Section 315(a)
prohibited censoring the content.38 The stations responded by airing
editorials opposing the spots.39
In Georgia, the other primary winner using pictures of fetuses,
Daniel Becker, faced opposition from Atlanta television stations.
During the July Fourth holiday, Becker had purchased air time
during Atlanta Braves baseball games on WTBS.40 Station execu-
tives did not want to air the ads and, after doing so based on their
interpretation of FCC rules, reported hundreds of complaints. They
were told by Diane Hofbauer, special assistant to the FCC general
counsel, that "while these things may be gross and upsetting, it
doesn't sound like they fall into the category of obscene."41
Later that month, Becker asked another Atlanta television
station, WAGA-TV, to air a political advertisement. The station
owner, Gillett Communications of Atlanta, Inc., joined by a Wash-
ington, D.C., law firm representing several unnamed radio and
television stations, filed with the FCC a petition for a declaratory
35Glover, supra note 33, at 2972.
36William Booth, Antiabortion TV Ads Catch On in Campaigns, Wash. Post, July
20, 1992, at Al.
37Keith Glover, Bailey's Bailiwick, Cong. Q., Sept. 26,1992, at 2971.
38Joe Flint, Furor Over Anti-Abortion Political Ads, Broadcasting, Apr. 27, 1992,
at 41-42.
39Id. at 41.
40Although TBS is a superstation reaching many cable outlets across the country,
the advertisements were shown only to the local Atlanta audience of WTBS-TV.
See Kathy Scruggs, Candidate Won't Pull Graphic Abortion Ads, ATL. Journal &
CONST., July 5, 1992, at A10.
41Booth, supra note 36, at A7.
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ruling. Instead of calling the material obscene, the petition asked
the Commission to concur with Gillett that ads "featuring dead
fetuses and fetal tissue depict excretory activities and are therefore
indecent."42 Because of this, Gillett wanted to channel the ads to a
time of day when children were less likely to be watching. This would
be consistent, the petition read, with the reasonable access and
noncensorship provisions of the Communications Act.43
The co-petitioner, the law firm Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays
and Handler (Kaye Scholer), went further and requested that the
"entire class of programming 'containing graphic and shocking
depictions of dead, bloodied or aborted fetuses or any other similar
graphic and shocking depictions of excised or bloody fetal tissue'"44
be deemed indecent. Kaye Scholer added that even if the Commis-
sion disagreed with the comparison of fetal tissue with excretory
activity, the FCC should defer to individual stations the judgment
of determining what is indecent and therefore worthy of being
restricted to certain times of day.45
In his response, FCC Mass Media Bureau Chief Roy Stewart
made several determinations. First, he declined to rule that any
depiction of fetal tissue or dead fetuses was indecent. He added that
rendering a ruling in advance of a broadcast would impose prior
restraint on protected speech. Stewart also took issue with the
desire to restrict a candidate's access to prime time. This, Stewart
said, would deprive the candidate of his right to determine how to
run his campaign. Further, Stewart wrote that upon review of a
videotape submitted by Gillett, the Bureau's conclusion was that
the content was not indecent, nor did the material constitute excre-
tory activity as the term was used in the FCC's indecency policy.46
THE BECKER DECISION
As the 1992 campaign neared its close, congressional candidate
Becker approached WAGA-TV in Atlanta asking to air a half-hour
advertisement following the broadcast of a professional football
42Letter from Roy Stewart, Chief, FCC Mass Media Bureau, to Vincent A. Pepper,






game on the Sunday afternoon prior to Tuesday's election. Gillett,
representing WAGA, filed suit against both Becker and the FCC in
federal district court, seeking an injunction against the ad and a
declaration regarding indecent political advertising.47
The court's ruling effectively reversed the decision contained in
Stewart's letter.48 The court held that prohibiting indecent material
was a valid exception to the reasonable access, equal opportunities
and no-censorship regulations of the Communications Act.49 The
court also ruled the material in Becker's program to be indecent. The
half-hour program included a segment titled "Abortion in America:
The Real Story," which contained pictures not found in Becker's
earlier advertisements. This material, according to the court,
showed "graphic depictions and descriptions of female gei italia, the
uterus, excreted uterine fluid, dismembered fetal body parts, and
aborted fetuses."50 In addition, citing Action for Children's Televi-
sion v. FCC,51 the court found the material indecent to the extent
that children readily could understand it.
The impact on children was compelling enough to warrant
government involvement, said the court, because the government
had an interest in "'safeguarding the physical and psychological
well-being of a minor.'"52 Noting that the FCC had not ruled on this
material, the court found that this video was more graphic and four
times longer than seen in Becker's previous advertisement.53 Con-
sequently, WAGA's offer to air the program between midnight and
6 a.m. would benefit the plaintiff and the public interest (protecting
children from indecent material) without inflicting undue injury on
Becker. Finally, the court acknowledged that under normal circum-
stances, it would have allowed the FCC to decide the issue, and
questioned the court's authority to enjoin the activities of the Com-
47John Harmon, Anti-abortion Ad Rattles TV Station, ATL. JOURNAL & CONST.,
Oct. 29,1992, at E4.
48See supra text accompanying notes 42-46.
49Gillett Commun. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 757-758 (N.D.
Ga. 1992), dismissed without op., remanded, 5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993).
50Id. at 763.
51852 F.2d 1332, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1988), overruled in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir.
1995).
52Gillett Commun. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. at 764 (quoting New York v. Ferber,
458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)).
53Gillett Commun. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. at 764.
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mission.54 A day after the district court's decision, a federal appeals
court dismissed Becker's appeal.55 Five days later Supreme Court
Justice Anthony Kennedy declined to hear an emergency appeal
from Becker.56
The FCC's Mass Media Bureau sent a letter to Becker, dated the
same day as the initial court decision.57 The candidate had asked for
intervention by the FCC to grant him access to the television station.
Bureau chief Stewart informed the candidate of the Commission's
unwillingness to render a decision before a program was broadcast.
Instead, Stewart invoked the 1984 staff memo and letter to Rep. Luken
to warn Becker that the staff believed it would not be unreasonable
for the licensee to rely on the informal staff opinion referred to above
and conclude that Section 312(a)(7) does not require it to air, outside
the "safe harbor," material it reasonably and in good faith believes is
indecent.58
That same day the FCC issued a Public Notice, calling for comments
on the issue of channeling material that presents depictions of dead
or aborted fetuses.59 The Commission requested comments on
whether broadcasters have the right or obligation to channel polit-
ical advertisements that are indecent, and material that may be
otherwise harmful to children.
INDECENCY AND HARM TO CHILDREN
A coalition of broadcasters and interest groups responded to the
Commission's call for comments.60 The coalition called on the Com-
54Id.
55Gillett Commun. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, dismissed without
op., remanded, 5 F.3d 1500.
56Rebecca Perl, High Court Lets TV Block Abortion Ad, But Candidate Can Seek
Late-Night Airtime, ATL. Journal & Const., Nov. 2, 1992, at B2.
57Letter from Roy J. Stewart, Chief, FCC Mass Media Bureau, to Daniel Becker,
7 F.C.C.R. 7282 (1992).
58Id at 7283.
59Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 7 F.C.C.R. 7297 (1992).
60The coalition included the National Association of Broadcasters, the Associa-
tion of Independent Television Stations, Fox Television, Capital Cities/ABC, NBC,
the Public Broadcasting Service and the Radio Television News Directors Associ-
ation. See Harry A. Jessell, Broadcasters Oppose Widening Indecency Net, Broad-
casting, Feb. 1, 1993, at 54.
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mission to allow broadcasters editorial control, letting them decide
what is indecent material or inappropriate for their audiences. They
argued broadening the definition of indecency would threaten "to
encompass news, informational and series dramatic programming
on a variety of topics."61 Gillett Communications added that broad-
casters should be able to reject entirely any offensive material that
"the station would otherwise reject as not in the public interest."62
Daniel Becker argued that broadcasters should not decide what is
indecent. "It would be too easy for a broadcaster to censor an unpopular
political message under the guise that the message was indecent."63
Joining Becker against channeling were the National Right to Life
Committee and the American Civil Liberties Union. They argued that
graphic abortion imagery did not constitute indecent political adver-
tising content, and that expanding the indecency definition would
"constitute a serious constitutional infringement by interfering with
First Amendment protection of news and entertainment program-
ming."64 There was also concern about channeling material deemed
not indecent but nonetheless "harmful to children."65 Political speech,
it was argued, qualified as "super-protected speech" and should be
protected against any discrimination on the basis of political ideas.66
The FCC did not release a ruling on the matter until after the
November 1994 election. That Memorandum Opinion and Order noted
that the majority of letters the FCC received strongly opposed broad-
casting depictions of abortion during times when children were likely
to be viewing. The Commission determined that political ads that
included "graphic abortion imagery" did not constitute indecency.67
But, citing both its Codification of Political Programming Policies and
the Communications Act, the FCC recognized that circumstances
might require a broadcaster to '"reasonably refuse broadcast time to
political candidates during certain parts of the day.'"68
61Id.
62Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7641 (1994).
63Jessell, supra note 60.
64Section 312(a)(7), 9 F.C.C.R. at 7640.
65Id
66Id. at 7641.
67Id. at 7639, n.3. The Commission noted its disagreement with the district
court's ruling, believing that Judge Hall had erroneously applied the indecency
standard. Id. at 7644 n.12.
68Id. at 7645 n.14 (citing Codification of the Commission's Political Programming
Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 682 (1991), quoting Commission Policy in Enforcing
Section 312 (a)(7) of the Communications Act, 68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1091 (1978)).
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In the Opinion and Order, the FCC suggested that Congress, in
mandating through Section 312(a)(7) that federal candidates must
be given broadcast time, surely had not intended to prevent broad-
casters from exercising discretion to consider the impact on children
in the audience.69 Lastly, the Commission prefaced its decision by
noting that candidates do not have a First Amendment right of
access to air time; rather, the question turns on the First Amend-
ment right of viewers to have access to political speech.70 Although
not indecent, the depiction of dead fetuses could warrant a licensee's
decision to channel a political ad containing such material to a time
when children are less likely to be watching, without transgressing
earlier conditions of the Communications Act.
Earlier in 1994, Michael Bailey had asked television stations to
air advertisements during the congressional campaign of an Ohio
candidate.71 The commercials contained photographs of dead fe-
tuses, but some also contained "scenes from gay pride marches
including footage of leather-clad men grinding pelvises and kissing
each other."72 After Bailey filed a complaint with the FCC in re-
sponse to a Cincinnati station's attempt to restrict the advertise-
ments to late night time periods (after 12:30 a.m.), the station
carried the advertisements during morning programming.
CONCLUSION
When he learned that his advertisements on Atlanta television
stations could be restricted to safe harbor hours, Daniel Becker
responded: "Live births, actual murders and dead bodies are shown
during prime time, but abortion shows must be viewed along with
pornography and other filth from midnight to 6 a.m."73 Government
in recent years has handed down various judgments broadening the
definition of indecency, banning or channeling indecent material,
and most recently applying the term "indecent" to heretofore pro-
tected political speech. These decisions invite challenge.
69Id at 7646 n.16.
70Id. at 7648.
71Christopher Stern, Antiabortion Ads Resurface at FCC, Broadcasting &
CABLE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 36.
72Vest, supra note 34, at D8.
73Perl, supra note 56, at B3.
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Candidate Bailey warned that "this is just the beginning. The
country hasn't seen anything yet."74 The content of several Bailey
commercials suggested the possibility of future clashes. Are there
some political and social ideas that when visualized become unten-
able to the viewing public, except during the hours when most of the
country has turned off their television sets? No candidate would
concede that channeling political statements accommodates his or
her interests.
When the FCC released its 1994 Memorandum Opinion and
Order, it took the opportunity to rectify the "indecency" error in the
district court's Becker decision. The Commission determined that
"aborted fetuses or fetal tissue, alone, cannot be considered 'excre-
tory by-products' within the meaning of the indecency definition."75
Doing so would expand the definition far beyond its limit. Yet the
Commission did see fit to override statutory law by allowing some
restrictions within Section 315.
Either political campaign advertisements (as political speech)
are a form of super-protected speech,76 and are thus untouchable, or
Sections 312(a)(7) and 315(a) should be reconsidered. Political
speech during campaigns by legally qualified candidates has tradi-
tionally been considered separately from other forms of program-
ming. But the FCC has also carved out loopholes for segregating
ideas and platforms to certain" segments of the day, even as it
champions a wide array of access for federal candidates.77
Precedents are few for responding to the offensive, outrageous
or indecent political ad. There are references in Commission deci-
sions to a 1984 memorandum by FCC staff78 and a letter from a
Commission chair to a United States representative79 suggesting
74Vest, supra note 34.
75Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7643 (1994).
76See T. BARTON CARTER, MARC A. FRANKLIN & JAY B. WRIGHT, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 34-35 (1993).
77Commission Policy in Enforcing Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
68 F.C.C.2d 1079, 1091 (1978). See also Codification of the Commission's Political
Programming Policies, 7 F.C.C.R. 678, 682 (1991).
78FCC Staff Memorandum, Jan. 6, 1984, quoted in Gillett Commun. of Atlanta,
Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 762 (N.D. Ga. 1992), appeal dismissed without op.,
5 F.3d 1500 (11th Cir. 1993).
79Letter from Mark S. Fowler to Hon. Thomas A. Luken, January 19, 1984, cited
in Vincent Pepper, 7 F.C.C.R. 5599, 5600 (1992) (Mass Media Bureau).
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that a broadcaster could be justified in interpreting Section 1464 of
the federal Criminal Code as an exception to Section 315. The FCC
has also justified regulation of broadcast indecency as support for
parental supervision of children and the protection of the family
against offensive broadcast material.80 This suggests that legal
scholars and the Commission should undertake additional study of
what political advertisements maybe restricted before broadcasters
will be able to determine the acceptable limits.
The outline established by the courts and commission hinges on
the interpretation of "harm to children." In the Becker decision,
District Court Judge Robert Hall recognized that his ruling rested
on the First Amendment requirement that "a content-based restric-
tion on speech, especially political speech, must be 'a precisely
drawn means of serving compelling state interest' to withstand
constitutional scrutiny." * His decision reflected the view that "safe-
guarding the physical and psychological well-being of minors" su-
perseded the public right to have access to political speech.82 The
Commission has stated that broadcasters may balance First Amend-
ment considerations against potential "harm[ ] to children" by
"graphic abortion imagery."83 Neither decision included empirical
evidence of viewing by or harm to children. When one concept—in-
decency—was unable to solve the problem, another was substituted.
The Commission has carved out a ruling independent of both
indecency precedents and political speech requirements. Broadcast-
ers were handed editorial control of content previously untouchable.
It remains to be seen if graphic abortion imagery is to be singled out.
However, the door is now open to revisit earlier decisions. If Con-
gress once gave broadcasters an unreasonable mandate to accom-
modate all legally qualified candidates for federal office, the FCC
has now altered that mandate. Protecting children is a justification
for restricting the ads of candidates promoting their pro-life beliefs
with controversial content. As candidate Bailey commented during
his first campaign, he could not get his commercials carried on
television before declaring for federal office; becoming a congres-
80See, e.g., Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C.
§ 1464, 5 F.C.C.R. 5297 (1990).
81Gillett Commun. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. 757, 764 (citing Action for Children's
Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d, 1332, 1343 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1988)).
82Gillett Commun. of Atlanta, Inc. v. Becker, 807 F. Supp. at 764.
83Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 7638, 7647 (1994).
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sional candidate was his only recourse.84 The appropriateness of
Section 312(a)(7) is a legitimate concern, but for now those candi-
dates with advertisements containing material some consider
shocking and offensive may learn that their ads will be found by the
Commission and courts to be harmful to children.
Some political advertising content, while legal, will be consid-
ered inappropriate for broadcast during times when children are in
the audience. Broadcasters may now draw some lines warranted by
potential harm to children. They may not have to worry about FCC
sanctions for disregarding Section 312(a)(7) of the Communications
Act under certain circumstances. But challenges will arise because
there will be candidates attempting to cross the blurry line.
There have been enough attempts to strengthen, tighten and
reinforce the political broadcast advertising "knot" in piecemeal
fashion so as to thoroughly tangle and fray the metaphorical rope.
Rather than wait for the next controversial political issue or con-
tinue to use past decisions on new media,85 it is time for a complete
reassessment of the need for mandatory political advertising time
on broadcast channels, the concepts of indecency and safe harbors,
the notion of harm to children, broadcasters' First Amendment
rights and the citizen's right to know. Each has been alternately
inserted into or excluded from arguments to fit a particular philo-
sophical or political perspective.
Putting the issue in a First Amendment context, several ques-
tions cast doubt on the wisdom of many of the decisions, regulations
and statutes. One tenet of freedom of speech is self-governance.
Meiklejohn maintained that the First Amendment forbade Congress
from abridging the freedom of speech whenever it was utilized for
the governing of the nation. This included even obscene content
because it has a "social importance."86
It may be harmful for children to view broadcast depictions of
the results of an abortion, or it may just be unsettling. But that alone
should by no means be the standard by which channeling is recom-
mended. The issue is a serious one for advocates of both positions
84Vest, supra note 34, at D8.
85Congress began addressing indecent programming content on cable and via the
Internet in 1995. See Christopher Stern, Senate Mandates TV Ratings System,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, June 19, 1995, at 12.
86ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT IS AN ABSOLUTE 246, 255
(Cynthia Brown ed., Meiklejohn Civil Liberties Institute 1981) (1961).
116 1 COMM. L. & POLT 1 (1996)
and deserves as broad a platform for discussion as possible. As long
as broadcasters are required to acquiesce to the political demands
of federal candidates, the ban on censorship should remain intact.
Ironically, the broadcast media's attempts to limit the expression of
one political position may have driven them further from the rights
they feel the Constitution should afford them.
